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Abstract. In the current scenario of increasing social inequality, the debate over the compensation 
received by directors and executives of large listed companies, and its justification, has intensified. 
Drawing on Agency Theory and Human Capital Theory, a multilevel analytical technique is used 
in this paper to examine the influence of firm-level variables and director-level variables on the 
individual compensation of the members of the board. The results obtained for the continental 
European context (Spain in particular) partially support the Human Capital Theory. Nevertheless, 
there is no evidence supportive of Agency Theory, as corporate governance mechanisms do not 
contribute to moderate the compensation of directors and there is no relationship between corporate 
performance and the compensation of directors. The analyses by subsamples (categories of direc-
tors) reveal that non-executive director’s compensation seems to be set for a group of individuals as 
a whole, depending mainly on firm-level characteristics, whereas executive director compensation 
is more based on the unique characteristics that a particular executive brings to the board.
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Introduction 
In the current scenario of increasing social inequality, the debate over the compensation 
received by directors and executives of large listed companies, and its justification, has inten-
sified. On the one hand, the complexity of the functions they perform, the value they bring 
to the companies they run, and the needs to attract and retain the best talent are often used 
to justify the amounts they receive. On the other hand, managerial power perspective sug-
gests that managers can exploit their informational advantages in order to extract excessive 
compensation (see Song and Wan (2019) for a review of these two competing views).
In the academic arena, although there is abundant literature on CEO compensation (for 
a review of the subject see Finkelstein et al., 2009; Murphy, 2013; Seo, 2015; Aguinis et al., 
2018, or Vo & Canil, 2019), little research has been done on the factors that explain the levels 
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of compensation of the members of the board of directors since, as some authors point out 
(Brick et al., 2006, or Andreas et al., 2012), this issue has only begun to attract attention 
more recently.
One of the main problems when analysing the compensation of the members of the board 
of directors is the lack of transparency that has traditionally surrounded the information on 
the compensation of directors. Until recently, public companies were required to disclose 
only total board compensation but not the compensation of each individual board member. 
For this reason the majority of the research about the determinants of director’s compensa-
tion (Hempel & Fay, 1994; Cordeiro et al., 2000; Elston & Goldberg, 2003; Ryan & Wiggins, 
2004; Linn & Park, 2005; Farrell et al., 2008; Sanchez et al., 2011; López et al., 2015; Baixauli 
et al., 2016, among others) uses as dependent variable the total compensation of the board 
or the average compensation of the members of the board (total board compensation divided 
by the number of directors in the board). 
Although this approach has provided useful insights, it prevents from analysing the influ-
ence of director level variables on their compensation, and aspects such as their category in 
the board (executive, external, independent) or their personal characteristics (experience or 
education among others) could not be considered. In this way, the papers mentioned above, 
mainly analyse the influence of variables related to the firm (company size, performance) and 
its corporate governance mechanisms (ownership structure and the composition of the board 
of directors) on the average compensation of the board members. The underlying theoretical 
foundations on which most of these studies are based are found in Agency Theory (Jensen 
& Meckling, 1976).
As more transparency is being required to public firms about individual director com-
pensation, some recent papers such as Marchetti and Stefanelli (2009), Horton et al. (2012), 
Bugeja et al. (2016), Chen and Keefe (2018), Ferris et al. (2018) or Fedaseyeu et al. (2018) 
analyse the influence of director level variables such as their skills or abilities on their com-
pensation, using Human Capital Theory as background for their hypotheses (Becker, 1964; 
Mincer, 1974).
Taking into account the previous literature, a multidisciplinary approach is used in this 
paper. Drawing on Agency Theory and Human Capital Theory, the determinants of director 
compensation in Spanish listed firms are studied. Taking advantage of the information on the 
individual remuneration of the members of the board of directors currently being published 
by listed Spanish companies, this paper analyses the influence that variables at company level 
(size, performance, ownership concentration, composition of the board) and also variables at 
the director level (education, experience) exert on directors’ compensation. To perform the 
analyses, a multilevel methodology was used, that allows to determine which type of variables 
(firm-level variables or director level-variables) contribute the most to explain differences in 
director’s compensation. To the best of our knowledge, this is an important contribution to 
the literature as this study is the first one to perform the analyses of director’s compensation 
using multilevel models1. Additionally, most of previous research using individual data on 
1 Sur et al. (2015) apply a multilevel analytic technique to examine how firm, industry and time levels effects drive 
CEO compensation in US corporations. Nevertheless, they neither analyze directors’ compensation, nor consider 
individual characteristics of directors.
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compensation is focused on Anglo-Saxon context and usually provides evidence for one 
specific type of directors. This paper also closes this gap in the literature by analysing the 
determinants of the compensation of the different categories of directors focusing on a con-
tinental European country (Spain). 
1. Literature review and hypotheses 
Although there is abundant literature on CEO compensation, this section refers specifically 
to papers on director’s compensation (a less developed area). Based on the results of these 
previous studies and using a multidisciplinary approach, the levels of compensation of the 
members of the board depend on the idiosyncrasies of each company, the mechanisms of 
control and corporate governance used by the company, and their profile. 
Figure 1 is a graphic representation of the hypotheses formulated in the study.
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Figure 1. Explanatory factors of director’s compensation
1.1. Characteristics of the company
The underlying theoretical foundations on which most of the studies focused on compen-
sation’ determinants rely are found in Agency Theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Under 
Agency Theory, previous empirical studies carried out in different countries indicate that 
director’s compensation is related to the characteristics of the business, especially the size of 
the company and its performance.
The overall objective of the board of directors is to advise and control senior management 
and at the same time to protect the interests of the shareholders. The literature shows that 
more complex companies require higher levels of skills and more effort from their directors, 
since the need for guidance and control generally increases as the company becomes more 
complex (Boone et  al., 2007; Lehn et  al., 2009). Therefore, it is expected to be a positive 
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relationship between the remuneration of the directors and the complexity of the business, 
given that the greater the complexity of the company, the greater the difficulty of the tasks 
performed by the board, and, consequently, the compensation policy should be designed to 
attract the most well-prepared and productive directors (Linn & Park, 2005).
The size of the firm is the variable that has most often been associated with the complexity 
of the firm in the literature on corporate governance (Linck et al., 2008; Coles et al., 2008). 
Larger companies tend to be characterized by greater complexity in terms of organizational 
structures and geographical dispersion, therefore they require more guidance from, and con-
trol by, board members. Several studies have found a positive relationship between the size 
of the firm and the compensation level of the directors (Ryan & Wiggins, 2004; Adams, 
2005; Linn & Park, 2005; Brick et al., 2006; Arrondo et al., 2008; Andreas et al., 2012). Con-
sequently, larger companies tend to be more complex, require more guidance and control, 
and therefore it is expected these companies to offer higher compensation to their directors.
H1: Firm complexity is positively related to the level of director’s compensation
According to Agency Theory, remuneration linked to results will motivate the directors 
to work more assiduously on behalf of the shareholders rather than aligning themselves with 
the interests of the managers (Cordeiro et al., 2000). Remuneration linked to corporate re-
sults is the central theoretical paradigm of the optimal contracting view which considers that 
the compensation policies constitute a mechanism of corporate governance to motivate the 
members of the board to make decisions that are aligned with the interests of the sharehold-
ers (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). In other words, directors of companies that perform better in 
the market are more likely to receive a higher compensation than those in firms that achieve 
worse results (Yermack, 2004; Brick et al., 2006). 
H2: Corporate performance is positively related to the level of director’s compensation
1.2. Elements of corporate governance
The board of directors is the internal body responsible for supervising and controlling 
managers to prevent them from engaging in opportunistic behavior that is detrimental 
to the shareholders (Fama & Jensen, 1983). However, directors are the shareholders’ del-
egated supervisors so the traditional agency conflict between shareholders and managers is 
equally applicable to the relationship between shareholders and directors given that there 
may be conflicting interests (Jensen, 1993). Assuming that there is no reason to suppose 
that managers automatically seek to maximize shareholder value, it follows that there is no 
reason to expect directors to do so either (Bebchuk & Fried, 2004). From this perspective 
(managerial power perspective), directors, exploiting their informational advantages, can 
engage in opportunistic behaviors that create a problem of moral hazard that could result 
in setting extraordinarily high levels remuneration for themselves. The existence of other 
corporate governance mechanisms such as the presence of large shareholders with suffi-
cient incentives to exercise direct control over managers and directors, or the composition 
of the board of directors itself, should help mitigate agency conflicts between shareholders 
and directors and influence the design of remuneration  policies for the board members 
(Andreas et al., 2012).
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Regarding the first of these mechanisms, ownership structure, it should be noted that 
when the ownership of the capital is distributed among a multitude of small shareholders, 
individually they have little incentive to get involved in the management of the business 
and monitor the behavior of managers. However large external shareholders, taking into ac-
count their vested interest, have greater incentives to be actively involved in the company’s 
management (Shleifer & Vishny, 1986). Cordeiro et al. (2000) indicate that majority external 
shareholders will try to avoid unnecessary costs, contributing to a greater moderation of 
board and management remuneration. Research on management compensation provides 
similar results. Gómez-Mejía and Marín (2006), in a review of the literature, point out that 
empirical research on executive remuneration shows that a higher concentration of owner-
ship implies more intense supervision and control and, therefore, a more moderate remu-
neration for the managers2. Although there is less evidence regarding the remuneration of 
board members, some studies also point in the same direction, especially for the countries 
of continental Europe such as Germany (Elston & Goldberg, 2003; Andreas et al., 2012) or 
Spain (Arrondo et al., 2008).
H3: Concentration of ownership is negatively related to the level of director’s compensa-
tion
The other element of corporate governance that may influence the level of compen-
sation is related to the composition of the board of directors. The theoretical viewpoint 
of the managerial power perspective suggests that there is a risk that directors will side 
with managers of the firm and pursue their own interests in detriment to those of the 
shareholders. For example, directors who allow high levels of compensation for manag-
ers gain their support to keep their own salaries high (Bebchuk et al., 2002). The pos-
sibility that this type of collusion between managers and directors can occur depends 
on the structure and composition of the board (Barkema & Gómez-Mejía, 1998). One 
metric commonly used as a proxy for the effectiveness of the control of the board is 
the percentage of independent directors (Hermalin & Weisbach, 1988; Weisbach, 1988). 
Independent directors have no direct links to the organization, so they are unlikely to 
be affected by problems such as a tendency to toe the group line or subordination to 
the Chief Executive Officer (CEO)’s decisions and they can analyse firm’s activities and 
decisions with more objectivity. Moreover, independents are expected to act on behalf of 
shareholders (Fama & Jensen, 1983), contributing, for example, to avoid excessive com-
pensation of the board.  On the contrary, a board of directors dominated by executive 
directors represents a severe limitation of their ability to control business policies that 
are not aligned with the interests of shareholders (Bebchuk & Fried, 2004). The empirical 
evidence is, nevertheless, unclear regarding the influence of the structure of the board 
on the compensation of its members (Andreas et al., 2012). 
H4: The independence of the board is negatively related to the level of director’s com-
pensation
2 Regarding ownership structure, recent evidence on CEO compensation (Borisova et al., 2019) indicates that the 
type of owner (government in particular) also influences the level and structure of executive compensation.
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1.3. Professional skills and experience
Up to this point discussion has referred to the influence of variables related to the company 
and its corporate governance mechanisms on the compensation received by the members of 
the board of directors. However, to explain the differences in remuneration between indi-
viduals, it is necessary to turn to the tenets of Human Capital Theory (Becker, 1964; Mincer, 
1974). This theory suggests that managers’ compensation should reflect their qualities and 
abilities, that is, it is necessary to consider other aspects beyond those contemplated in Agen-
cy Theory by taking into account human and social capital in the forms of skills, experience, 
and access to information and knowledge (Kor & Sundaramurthy, 2009). 
This approach is particularly appropriate taking into account that the role of the board of 
directors is, in addition to controlling the management team, guiding it in the decision-making 
process. Due to the information that directors have about the company and its environment, 
their experience, knowledge, etc. they enrich the organization’s decision-making process. In 
this sense, Hillman and Dalziel (2003) focus on the concept of board capital which consists of 
both human capital (experience, expertise, reputation) and relational capital (network of ties 
to other firms and external contingencies) and affirm that both insiders and outsiders on the 
board have important human capital that pertains to the provision of advice and counsel. In this 
sense, scholars have posited that the human and social (relational) capital of individual board 
members shapes their ability to govern and offer advice to the management team (Hillman 
& Dalziel, 2003; Kor & Sundaramurthy, 2009). Moreover, in a comprehensive review of the 
literature, Johnson et al. (2013) indicate that the demographic characteristics, human capital, 
and social capital of the directors have an important impact on the company’s results. 
There are very few studies that take the personal and professional profile of the director 
as an explanatory variable of the remuneration they earn. The difficulty of accessing detailed 
and individualized information is a barrier to this type of analysis, which is however, very 
useful in explaining intra-company differences in directors’ compensation. Some examples 
are the studies of Marchetti and Stefanelli (2009) and Horton et al. (2012) which, for the 
UK, provide evidence consistent with the influence of the human and social capital of the 
directors on their remuneration or, more recently, the article by Fedaseyeu et al. (2018) in 
which, for the American case, they find that the more experienced directors receive greater 
compensation. These results are consistent with the Human Capital Theory. A company that 
does not adequately compensate its directors for their skills should have more difficulty in 
attracting and retaining talented board members. 
H5: The qualifications and experience of the directors is positively related to the level of 
director’s compensation.
2. Sample and variables
2.1. Sample
This database contains information on the individual compensation of 1110 directors of Spanish 
listed firms in the year 2013. This information was handy collected from the Annual Report on 
Remuneration of Directors and refers to all board members of 90 different Spanish listed firms. 
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Company-level data for economic and financial information was obtained from the SABI 
(System of Analysis of Iberian Balance Sheets) database while the Annual Corporate Gover-
nance Reports were used to extract data relating to the board of directors and the ownership 
structure of the company for each of the companies analysed. Information on demographic 
profile, education and experience of each director was obtained from Boardex database.
The data on the compensation of the directors refers to the year 20133 (the first year for 
which individualized information is available), while the explanatory variables included in 
the models have been lagged by one period in order to reduce econometric problems of 
endogeneity (Brick et al., 2006).
2.2. Variables
2.2.1. Dependent variable
In keeping with authors such as Marchetti and Stefanelli (2009), among others, the depen-
dent variable used is the annual cash compensation of each director (CASHCOMP). Annual 
cash compensation refers to year 2013 and is calculated as the sum of the following items: 
salaries, fixed remuneration, attendance fees, short-term variable remuneration, long-term 
variable remuneration, remuneration for membership on board committees, severance pay-
ments, and other items. 
Table 1. Cash compensation of the directors: Descriptive statistics
Concept Frequency (%) N Mean Stand. Dev.
Salary 17.5% 194 502.19 559.16
Fixed Remun. 63.0% 699 89.02 116.24
Attendance 62.3% 691 34.14 32.09
Variable s/t 16.2% 180 482.77 700.39
Variable l/t 1.6% 18 460.83 328.93
Committees 37.9% 421 49.83 61.58
Severance 0.4% 4 707 681.27
Others 19.4% 215 61.72 126.91
Total Remun. 100% 1110 307.92 711.14
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics of the different concepts that make up the cash 
remuneration of the directors. For each concept, the frequency indicates the percentage of 
directors in the sample who perceive the concept and N is the number of directors in the 
sample who receive it. The values of the mean, standard deviation, percentiles, minimum 
and maximum are expressed in thousands of euros. The average total cash compensation 
received by the 1110 directors of the sample amounts to 307,920 euros, although it varies 
3 Although this information is quite old, it can be considered to properly and reasonably represent the current situ-
ation. In this regard, in 2013 the directors and executives of the largest Spanish listed companies earned 75 times 
more than their employees. These figures are not very different from those for the year 2018, which reveal that the 
directors and executives of the largest Spanish listed companies earned 79.2 times more than their employees.
Journal of Business Economics and Management, 2020, 21(1): 180–199 187
greatly. With regards to the elements that make up this compensation, it can be seen that the 
components most frequently received by the directors are fixed remuneration (63% of the 
sample’s directors), attendance fees (62% of the directors), and remuneration for member-
ship on board committees (38% of the directors). The average fixed remuneration stands at 
89,000 euros, attendance fees at 34,140 euros and remuneration for membership on board 
committees at 49,830 euros.
Apart from severance pay, which is by nature a sporadic concept, salary (502,190 euros), 
short-term variable remuneration (483,000 euros), and long-term remuneration (461,000 eu-
ros) are the major items. These concepts are received by a minority percentage of directors 
who are normally executives and therefore also perform managerial functions in the company.
Figure 2 shows the percentage breakdown of the cash remuneration for the four catego-
ries of directors defined in Spain (executive, independent, proprietary, and other external 
directors). As can be seen, the composition of the compensation of executive directors is 
very different from that of the other directors. For executive directors, the most important 
components of remuneration are salary and short term variable remuneration. For external 
directors (independent, proprietary, and other external directors) the most important com-
ponent is fixed remuneration followed by remuneration for committee membership (in the 
case of independents), attendance fees (in the case of proprietaries) and other items (in the 
case of other external directors).
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Figure 2. Composition of the cash compensation of the different categories of directors  
(source: Prepared by authors)
2.2.2. Independent variables
Independent variables are classified into company and board related variables and personal 
characteristics of the directors (individual variables).
Company and board variables (level 2):
 – Firm size (SIZE): This variable is defined as the logarithm of the total assets of the 
company.
 – Firm performance (ROE): Return on Equity, calculated as the year’s result divided by 
equity, has been used as a measure of the company’s performance. 
 – Concentration of ownership (BLOCK): The variable Blockholders represents the sum 
of all significant participations in the capital of the company (in percentage).
 – Board Independence (INDEP): Measured as the proportion of independent directors 
on the board of directors of the company. 
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Individual variables (level 1):
 – Gender (GENDER): A dummy variable that takes on the value of 1 if the director is 
female and 0 otherwise.
 – Nationality (FOREIGN): A dummy variable that takes on the value of 1 if the director 
is a foreigner and 0 otherwise.
 – Masters Education (MASTER): A dummy variable that takes on the value of 1 if the 
director holds a Master’s degree or MBA and 0 otherwise.
 – Doctoral Education (PhD): A dummy variable that takes on the value of 1 if the di-
rector has a doctorate and 0 otherwise. 
 – International Education (INTTRAIN): A dummy variable that takes on the value of 
1 if the director has studied in a foreign country and 0 otherwise.
 – Tenure (TIMEBOARD): The length of time the director has been on the board has 
been used as a measure of experience. This variable is expressed in years.
 – Interlocking (QUOTEDB): To gauge the impact of the director’s membership on the 
boards of directors of other companies, a variable has been used that reflects the 
number of boards of listed companies that the director has served on.
 – Executive (EXEC): A dummy variable that takes on the value of 1 for executive di-
rectors and 0 for the rest.
Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics of the explanatory variables for the entire sample. 
Panel A includes the level 2 variables (company and board), while Panel B includes the level 
1 variables (individual).
With regards to the company variables, it is interesting to note the average value of the 
variable BLOCK (51.2%), which represents a high degree of ownership concentration of the 
companies in the sample; a characteristic of Spanish listed companies. The average percent-
age of independent members on the boards of the companies in the sample is 35.7%, and 
therefore very close to the one-third recommended by the Good Governance Code in force 
at the time.
Regarding the variables related to the demographic profile of the directors, the data shows 
that only 12% of the directors are women, a proportion identical to that of directors of 
foreign nationalities. As for the variables related to education, 41% have a master’s degree, 
17% are doctors and 36% have an international education. Regarding their experience and 
relationships, the average tenure on the board is 7 and a half years and on average they have 
been on the boards of 3 listed companies. 
Table 2. Characteristics of the companies and the directors: Descriptive statistics
Panel A: Firm and board variables
Variable Mean Median Standard Deviation
Number 
observations
SIZE 14.219 13.894 2.039 90
ROE 0.0435 0.072 0.4925 90
BLOCK 0.5123 0.5477 0.2301 90
INDEP 0.3569 0.3333 0.1769 90
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Panel B: Director Characteristics 
Variable Mean Median Standard Deviation
Number 
observations
GENDER 0.12 0.00 0.33 1108
FOREIGN 0.12 0 0.32 996
MASTER 0.41 0 0.49 892
PHD 0.17 0 0.38 892
INTTRAIN 0.36 0 0.48 884
EXEC 0.17 0 0.37 1110
TIMEBOARD 7.52 5.80 7.30 990
QUOTEDB 2.93 2.00 2.84 990
3. Methodology and results
3.1. Multilevel analysis
This research includes variables measured in different levels: variables at the individual level 
(related to the profile of the directors) and variables at the company (or board) level. As 
individuals (directors) can be grouped into firms (boards), it means a hierarchical structure.
One of the characteristics of hierarchical structures (Aguinis et al., 2013; Shen, 2016) is 
that individuals of the same group (in this case the directors of the same company or board) 
are expected to be more similar to each other than the individuals of the other groups. This 
implies that subjects belonging to the same group are not very likely to be independent of 
one another, which constitutes a serious breach of a basic assumption of the general linear 
model: independence between observations. The multilevel nature of the data requires that 
the dependence between the observations be treated both conceptually and analytically (Sni-
jders & Bosker, 2012). One way to solve this is the use of multilevel models that allow these 
types of hierarchical structures to be approached taking into account the dependency that 
exists between the subjects of the same group (Pardo et al., 2007). 
The following equation (for the sake of simplification only one explanatory variable is 
included) reflects the general model where subscript i refers to each individual and subscript 
j refers to each one of the groups in which those individuals are grouped (in this case i and 
j refer to individuals and companies/boards respectively).
 Yij = β0j + β1jxij + eij, (1)
where Y is the dependent variable (in this case, cash director’s compensation measured in 
logarithms); β 0j is the constant or intersection; β1j represents the slope of the regression line, 
i.e. the change in the dependent variable (Y) that the model predicts for each unit that the 
independent variable (x) increases; xij is the independent variable, that can be measured at 
any level (individual or company). Finally, eij represents the error related to each individual 
End of Table 2
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prediction, that is, the difference between each individual’s actual compensation, and that 
predicted by the model.
In the multilevel model, the parameters β0j and β1j are not interpreted as fixed constants 
but as variables whose values can change from one company to another.
 β0j = β0 + u0j; (2)
 β1j = β1 + u1j, (3)
where β0 is the mean intersection for the set of companies and u0j represents the variability of 
each company with respect to that mean. Similarly, the term β1j is composed of a fixed part, 
which is the mean slope for the set of companies (β1) and a random part (u1j) that reflects 
the variability of the slopes between the different companies.
It is necessary to mention that for coefficient β0 (the constant or intersection) to have 
a precise meaning it is normal to re-scale the values of the independent variables, which is 
done by subtracting from each value of each independent variable, its mean, i.e. using the 
differential or centered scores instead of direct scores. Thus, the coefficient β0 becomes the 
mean of the dependent variable. Following these recommendations, centered independent 
variables are used in the estimated models, with the exception of the dummy variables which 
are included un-centered.
Substituting expressions (2) and (3) in (1), the general expression of the multilevel model 
is obtained:
 Yij = β0 + β1xij + u0j + u1jxij + eij . (4)
As it can be seen in equation (4) what distinguishes this function from the standard linear 
regression models is the presence of more than one residual, that is, the key is in the structure 
of the random part of the model (u0j + u1jxij + eij). This particularity implies the need to use 
special procedures for estimating the parameters (Goldstein, 1995). In the fixed part of the 
model, the variables can be measured at any level (individual or company).
3.2. Results
Tables 3 and 4 show the results of the different multilevel models estimated for the total 
sample as well as for the subsamples of executive directors, external directors, proprietary 
directors and independent directors. Although the arguments exposed in the previous sec-
tion and the hypotheses formulated apply to all members of the board, the differences in their 
compensation indicate that it is more appropriate to estimate separate regressions for each 
category of directors. The first one (Model 1) is the so-called unconditional or null model 
which is the simplest possible multilevel model and it is obtained by eliminating everything 
related to the independent variables, incorporating only the constant. The following model 
(Model 2) incorporates only the level 2 (company and board) explanatory variables and Mo-
del 3 incorporates level 1 (individual) and level 2 (company and board) explanatory variables. 
Specifically, the “mixed” procedure in SPSS 22 is used to perform the multilevel analyses 
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(for an excellent overview of the use of SPSS to estimate multilevel models, see Pardo et al. 
(2007)). Multicollinearity is tested by calculating Variance Inflation Factors (VIFs). As no 
VIF is above 2 (well below the accepted maximum of 10) it is verified that multicollinearity 
does not affect the results. As a measure of goodness of fit of the models the pseudo-R2 (Sni-
jders & Bosker, 2012) are provided. Pseudo-R2 is computed as the reduction in total variance 
achieved by a model with respect to the null model.
For the total sample, and with regards to the null model, Table 3 shows the estimated value 
of the constant, which is the only fixed effects parameter incorporated in this model and it is 
an estimate of the mean of the population of the dependent variable (LNCASHCOMP). The 
truly informative aspect of this model is the estimation of the covariance of the parameters. For 
the analysis of the entire sample, the inter-company variance (0.604) indicates how much the 
compensation of the directors varies between companies, while the variance of the residuals 
indicates how much the compensation varies within each company (1.015). To contrast that 
variance components are different from zero, the Wald Z statistic has been calculated.
The variability among firms represents [0.604/(1.015 + 0.604)] = 0.3731 (37.31%) of the 
total variability of director compensation. This coefficient (37.31%) is the intraclass correla-
tion coefficient (ICC). 
As there is a significant variation between companies, in the next step level 2 variables 
(variables related to the company) are used in order to analyse the extent to which they can 
explain this variability. Once introduced level 2 variables in the model, only the influence 
of the size of the company is statistically significant. Several studies have documented that 
the size of the company is the most important variable in explaining the level of director’s 
compensation (Ryan & Wiggins, 2004; Adams, 2005; Linn & Park, 2005; Brick et al., 2006; 
Arrondo et al., 2008; Andreas et al., 2012). 
As shown in the table, the variation between companies is substantially reduced when 
the level 2 explanatory variables are taken into consideration, dropping from 0.604 to 0.3618.
In order to explain the variability of the compensation received by the directors of the 
same company, it is necessary to introduce level 1 variables. When the level 1 variables are 
introduced, only some of them are seen to be statistically significant. Specifically, the results 
indicate that the position of the director (executive vs external), their domestic nature, their 
tenure, and their experience in other boards significantly influence the compensation they 
receive. Contrary to what would be expected, there is no significant influence of any of the 
variables related to the director’s education. 
Therefore, as far as qualifications are concerned, it seems that aspects related to experi-
ence, such as tenure and interlocking, are positively valued in terms of compensation. This 
evidence is consistent with other papers such as Goh and Gupta (2016) and Ferris et  al. 
(2018) and indicates that directors’ ability to contribute to board decision-making and their 
set of resources are valued by the firm.
Finally, the results for the total sample indicate that by controlling for all the explanatory 
variables simultaneously, a high percentage of independent members on the board positively 
influences the compensation of directors, which contradicts the hypothesis formulated. How-
ever, similar results have been observed by authors such as Ryan and Wiggins (2004), Adams 
(2005), Andreas et al. (2012) or Andrés et al. (2017). 
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Table 3. Multilevel models for the total sample, executive directors and external directors
TOTAL SAMPLE EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS 
EXTERNAL 
DIRECTORS 
Level and 
Variable
Model 
1
Model 
2
Model
 3
Model 
1
Model 
2
Model 
3
Model 
1
Model 
2
Model 
3
Intercept 4.780*** 4.840*** 4.495*** 6.583*** 6.601*** 6.734*** 4.372*** 4.439*** 4.783***
Level 2
SIZE 0.245*** 0.219*** 0.284*** 0.233*** 0.238*** 0.217***
BLOCK 0.112 0.072 0.021 –0.032 0.092 0.173
INDEP 0.592 0.863* 0.602  0.510 0.523 0.842*
ROE 0.057 0.045 –0.078 –0.043 0.107 0.070
Level 1
EXEC 2.147***
GENDER –0.100 –0.328 –0.052
FOREIGN –0.173** –0.048 –0.165**
MASTER –0.011 0.041 –0.009
PHD –0.281 –0.211 0.002
INTTRAIN 0.040 –0.060 0.056
TIMEBOARD 0.016*** 0.003 0.019***
QUOTEDB 0.030*** 0.113*** 0.024***
Variance Components
Within–firm 
(L1) variance 1.015
*** 1.010*** 0.303*** 0.820*** 0.796*** 0.624*** 0.269*** 0.274*** 0.198***
Intercept(L2) 
variance 0.604
*** 0.362*** 0.288*** 0.460*** 0.110 0.068 0.634*** 0.420*** 0.380***
ICC 37.31% 26.36% 48.68% 35.68% 12.12% 9.87% 70.22% 60.50% 65.70%
N 1052 1052 811 183 183 143 867 867 667
–2log Likelihood 3184.45 3010.39 1574.25 550.22 491.44 386.15 1596.78 526.26 1088.26
Pseudo R2 0.152 0.635 0.292 0.459 0.231 0.360
Significance levels: *** Indicates p < 0.01; ** Indicates 0.01 < p < 0.05; * Indicates 0.05 < p < 0.1.
Table 4. Multilevel models for proprietary directors and independent directors
PROPIETARY DIRECTORS INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS 
Level and 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Intercept 4.270*** 4.354***  4.393*** 4.429*** 4.480*** 4.536***
Level 2
SIZE 0.235*** 0.192*** 0.218*** 0.205***
BLOCK 0.051  0.052 0.022 0.101
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PROPIETARY DIRECTORS INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS 
Level and 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
INDEP 0.062  0.483 0.651 0.951**
ROE 0.074 –0.010 0.101 0.060
Level 1
EXEC
GENDER –0.078 –0.086
FOREIGN –0.170 –0.217**
MASTER 0.009 –0.031
PHD –0.012 –0.004
INTTRAIN 0.132* 0.042
TIMEBOARD 0.019*** 0.020***
QUOTEDB 0.034** 0.017**
Variance Components
Within-firm 
(L1) variance 0.315
*** 0.317*** 0.230*** 0.149*** 0.158*** 0.126***
Intercept(L2) 
variance 0.635
*** 0.492*** 0.428*** 0.551*** 0.333*** 0.273***
ICC 66.85% 60.86% 65.03% 78.71% 67.83% 68.33%
N 414 414 303 402 402 326
-2log 
Likelihood 878.71 865.85 605.83 620.54 580.83 475.70
Pseudo R2 0.148 0.307 0.298 0.430
Significance levels: ***Indicates p < 0.01; **Indicates 0.01 < p < 0.05; *Indicates 0.05 < p < 0.1.
The covariance of the estimated parameters indicate that the incorporation of level 1 
explanatory variables reduced intra-company variability from 1.015 to 0.303, that is, by 70%. 
Once the results for the total sample are obtained, the model was estimated for each of 
the two main categories of directors, that is executive and external (see Table 3) as well as 
for the two main categories of external directors, that is proprietary and independent (see 
Table 4). Some interesting results emerge from these analyses. Similar to total sample, firm 
size and the membership of the director on the boards of other companies positively affect 
compensation for all categories of directors. Nevertheless, the percentage of independents 
on the board, tenure in the board and nationality of the director are only significant for 
external directors.
Within the subsample of external directors there are also differences between proprietary 
and independent directors. It is worthwhile to note that the positive influence of board inde-
pendence on compensation is only significant for the sub-sample of independent directors, 
which can suggest more entrenchment of this category of directors.
End of Table 4
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Apart from differences in the significant variables, the covariance parameter estimates in-
dicate that intra-company variability (within variance L1) is much higher for executive direc-
tors than for outsiders. Opposite is true for inter-company variance (L2), which is higher for 
outsider directors. As intra-company variability must be explained by director level variables 
and inter-company variability is explained by firm level variables, these results suggest that 
firms set out the compensation of each executive director by taking into account the unique 
characteristics that this particular executive brings to the board, whereas non-executive di-
rector’s compensation seems to be set in the firm for a group of individuals as a whole (de-
pending on the characteristics of the firm). These results are consistent with different roles 
played by each category of directors. 
Conclusions
The compensation of executives and directors of large listed companies has generated intense 
debate in practice and in the economic literature. In the academic field, although there is a 
large body of literature on CEO remuneration, few studies have been carried out on the fac-
tors that explain the levels of compensation of the members of the boards of directors and 
furthermore, few of these studies use individualized information on board members. This 
paper closes this gap in the literature by analyzing the determinants of the compensation of 
the different categories of directors and including individualized information on the board 
members, focusing on the Spanish context.
This research is grounded in Agency Theory and Human Capital Theory, contrasting the 
influence that variables at company level and also variables at the individual level exert on 
compensation. To perform the contrasts, multilevel analysis was used. 
Using a sample of 1,110 observations at the director level (corresponding to 90 Spanish 
listed companies), evidence indicates that the level of directors’ compensation is determined 
by both company-related factors and the demographic characteristics of the individuals.
The results show that the size of the company is the variable that most explains the 
differences in compensation between companies. With regard to the profile of directors, 
tenure and experience are the key factors in determining the compensation of directors. 
However, contrary to what would be expected, other personal characteristics such as educa-
tion, for example, do not appear to be decisive in the compensation of any of the categories 
of directors. Therefore, companies seem to value primarily the directors’ experience, either 
within the same company or on the boards of other companies. 
Summarizing, the results obtained for the continental European context (Spain in partic-
ular) partially support the Human Theory of Capital. Nevertheless, evidence is not supportive 
of Agency Theory, as corporate governance mechanisms do not contribute to moderate the 
compensation of directors and there is no relationship between corporate performance and 
the compensation of directors.
Furthermore, it is worth highlighting the analyses by different categories of directors 
whose results reveal some differences that are not disclosed when an analysis of the total 
sample is performed. The findings by subsamples indicate that intra-company variability is 
much higher for executive directors than for outsider directors. This evidence is consistent 
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with the idea that non-executive director’s compensation seems to be set for a group of in-
dividuals as a whole, whereas executive director compensation is more based on the unique 
characteristics that a particular executive brings to the board.
As for the academic implications of the study it is necessary to consider that the results 
obtained imply the need for more in-depth research using multilevel methodology with the 
aim of analysing which type of variables are those that determine, to a large degree, the 
compensation of the directors. In this way, this paper suggests that firm level variables are 
more important in determining non-executive director’s compensation, whereas executive 
director compensation seems to be more dependent on the individual level variables. It has 
been found that experience (inside and outside the firm) is highly valued, but it is necessary 
to find other transferable abilities of board members which are “priced” in the managerial 
labor market. 
On the other hand, as for the practical implications for society, it must be taken into 
account that the compensation of board members is a controversial topic in society. This 
research sheds some light on this issue, although more studies are needed to delve deeper 
into this topic. Likewise, it is important to note that the positive effect of the presence of 
independent directors on the directors’ compensation is the opposite to what was expected. 
These results could be justified from two different perspectives: a) on the one hand, inde-
pendent directors may be using their greater power or weight on the board to increase their 
own remuneration (entrenchment by independent directors); b) on the other hand, higher 
remuneration granted to independent directors as their weight on the board increases could 
be interpreted as a way to limit their independence and their supervisory role. In either case, 
it would be interesting to look deeper into this aspect since it challenges the recommenda-
tions included in the good governance codes concerning the proper weight of independent 
directors on the board of directors and their presence on the delegated committees. 
In the end this paper constitutes an initial effort to shed some light on the determinants 
of directors’ compensation by taking advantage of the new, individualized information that 
Spanish listed companies are required to publish in an Annual Report on Remuneration of 
Directors. The paper presents several contributions. On the one hand, the scarce previous 
evidence on this topic is focused on Anglo-Saxon countries. On the other hand, this study 
uses a multilevel methodology which is an innovation in this field and provides evidence 
on the determinants of director compensation for each category of directors. However, the 
study also has some limitations. In the first place, the use a cross-sectional design prevents 
from exploring patterns over time. Likewise, the sample is focused on the Spanish context, a 
country with an institutional context which is similar to that of other countries in Europe, but 
very different from Anglo-Saxon countries. Also, the information available on the personal 
characteristics of directors is limited. Future research that incorporates a greater number of 
periods and considers new explanatory variables will allow a deeper analysis of this question 
and clarify the rationality (or the lack of rationality) of directors’ compensation. 
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